TCP · Entity Tax Compliance · 6 practice questions
S Corporation One-Class-of-Stock Test
An S corporation's shares must have identical distribution and liquidation rights, but voting rights may differ. Below, sort stock terms and agreements by whether they pass the one-class-of-stock test.
Try one first
Hint
Check the basic S corporation eligibility rules in a simple order: shareholder count, shareholder type, and whether the corporation has only one class of stock.
Answer A. An S corporation must be a domestic corporation with no more than 100 shareholders, only eligible shareholders (generally U.S. citizens or residents, certain trusts, and estates), and only one class of stock (differences in voting rights are permitted). Option A meets these core requirements, so it qualifies for S status on the stated facts.
Why not B: Tempting because the shareholder count and single class of stock are acceptable, but a nonresident alien is not an eligible S shareholder; a single disqualifying shareholder defeats S status.
Why not C: This distractor may seem plausible, but partnerships are not permitted shareholders of an S corporation. Having a partnership as a shareholder disqualifies the corporation from S status despite the low shareholder count.
Why not D: S corporations may not have more than one class of stock with different economic rights. Different distribution rights indicate multiple classes of stock, which prevents S treatment even if shareholder eligibility and count are satisfied.
Sort it
The stated terms preserve identical per-share distribution and liquidation rights.
The stated terms give some shares different distribution or liquidation rights.
| Item | Goes to |
|---|---|
| Pine issues voting and nonvoting common shares with identical distribution and liquidation rights. | Passes the stock-class testVoting differences alone do not create a second class. |
| Pine's charter gives some shares priority over other shares for nonliquidating distributions. | Fails the stock-class testThe priority changes those shares' legal rights to distributions. |
| Pine makes unequal discretionary cash payments, but all governing documents and binding agreements preserve identical per-share distribution and liquidation rights. | Passes the stock-class testActual payment differences alone do not change the rights attached to shares. |
| Pine's shares have equal current distribution rights, but some shares receive liquidation proceeds before others. | Fails the stock-class testIdentical current distribution rights cannot cure different liquidation rights. Both must match. |
| Pine borrows from a shareholder using a bona fide, nonconvertible note with fixed principal, fixed interest, and a stated maturity. | Passes the stock-class testThe instrument is bona fide debt, not another class of stock. |
| Pine's binding shareholder agreement entitles selected shares to larger distributions per share, despite identical rights in its charter. | Fails the stock-class testBinding agreements count. Identical charter terms do not override an agreement granting different distribution rights. |
| Pine gives some shares enhanced voting power to elect most directors, while preserving identical distribution and liquidation rights. | Passes the stock-class testGreater board control changes governance, not the economic rights tested here. |
| Pine issues shares entitled to a fixed preferred distribution before its existing common shares receive distributions. | Fails the stock-class testA fixed preferred distribution creates different distribution entitlements, even without a liquidation preference. |
| Pine's bona fide buy-sell agreement requires departing owners to sell at book value, preserves distribution and liquidation rights, and has no circumvention purpose. | Passes the stock-class testThe book-value sale formula does not, by itself, create different distribution or liquidation rights. |
| Pine's bank loan limits future dividends for all shares without changing their identical distribution and liquidation rights. | Passes the stock-class testA company-wide dividend restriction limits payments without giving any shares preferential rights. |
Key points
- Remember: Check what each share is entitled to, not who controls the vote.
- Read governing documents and binding agreements for distribution or liquidation preferences.
- Unequal discretionary payments alone do not establish unequal share rights.
- Bona fide debt does not create a second class of stock.
How the exam traps you
- Treating voting and nonvoting common shares as two prohibited classes. Compare distribution and liquidation rights, not voting labels.
- Treating every unequal cash payment as an automatic stock-class violation. Determine whether legal entitlements differ; unequal discretionary payments alone are not enough.
- Assuming every shareholder agreement creates a second class. Check its terms. Board-control and ordinary buy-sell provisions do not automatically change distribution or liquidation rights.
Question 2
Hint
For S corporation eligibility, separate voting rights from economic rights. The one-class-of-stock rule is mainly about distribution and liquidation rights.
Answer D. An S corporation is permitted only one class of stock for Subchapter S purposes, but differences in voting rights alone do not create a second class. The crucial test is whether shares differ in their rights to distributions or liquidation proceeds. Because voting and nonvoting common shares have the same economic rights, creating them generally will not jeopardize S status.
Why not A: Priority for nonliquidating distributions means the shares do not have identical economic rights. Even if not labeled "preferred," any priority in distributions typically results in a second class of stock under the S-corp rules.
Why not B: Tempting because "fixed" can seem like a minor design feature, but priority for a preferred distribution changes the economic rights of those shares relative to others. That unequal distribution right normally creates a second class of stock and would disqualify S treatment.
Why not C: This distractor targets liquidation rights, which are part of the one-class-of-stock test. Different liquidation entitlements give shareholders unequal economic rights, so such a change generally creates a prohibited second class of stock.
Question 3
Hint
Focus on the basic S corporation eligibility rules: who may be a shareholder, and what kinds of stock differences are allowed.
Answer C. S corporations may have only eligible shareholders (individuals, certain trusts and estates, certain tax-exempt organizations, etc.); partnerships (and entities treated as partnerships for tax purposes) are not eligible shareholders. Therefore a transfer of S stock to an LLC that is classified as a partnership would create an ineligible shareholder and terminate the S election unless inadvertent-termination relief applied.
Why not A: Candidates often conflate 'one class of stock' with identical voting rights. The S-rule refers to identical distribution and liquidation rights; differences in voting rights alone do not create a second class of stock, so this fact pattern does not by itself terminate the S election.
Why not B: A bank covenant limiting dividends may constrain distributions but does not alter shareholder eligibility or the economic distribution rights of the outstanding shares. On its face, this covenant does not create a disqualifying shareholder or a second class of stock.
Why not D: Unequal ownership percentages are permissible. The S-election is endangered by differences in the economic rights of share classes (distribution/liquidation) or by ownership by an ineligible shareholder, not merely by shareholders holding different percentage interests.
Question 4
Hint
Ask whether a trust that was a grantor trust at death loses eligibility immediately or has a limited continuation. Remember that S‑status is tested continuously and specific trust elections (QSST/ESBT) can affect post‑death eligibility.
Answer B. A trust treated as owned by its grantor is an eligible S shareholder while the grantor is alive; upon the grantor's death it becomes a former grantor trust that may remain an S shareholder only for a limited two‑year post‑death period. That two‑year period runs to the second anniversary of the grantor's death, here January 1, 20X7, so Harbor retains S status through December 31, 20X6 and the S election terminates on January 1, 20X7. Absent a timely QSST or ESBT election, a permissible transfer to an eligible shareholder, or relief, the trust's ineligibility at that point causes termination.
Why not A: This is tempting because death changes the trust's tax status, but it is incorrect: a former grantor trust is allowed a limited two‑year continuation as an S shareholder. The trust does not automatically lose S‑shareholder eligibility on the date of death.
Why not C: Incorrect: S‑shareholder eligibility is tested continuously, not only at the time the S election became effective. Initial eligibility does not prevent termination once the limited post‑death period expires unless the trust qualifies under a permitted category (e.g., QSST or ESBT) or a timely transfer occurs.
Why not D: Incorrect: beneficiary composition alone does not make an ordinary revocable or former grantor trust an eligible S shareholder indefinitely. To remain eligible beyond the post‑death window the trust must meet the specific statutory/regulatory requirements of a QSST or be an ESBT and make the appropriate election.
Question 5
Hint
Ask which item actually defines a class of stock under S‑corporation rules: differences in contractual economic entitlements to distributions and liquidation proceeds, or differences in governance or one‑time payments?
Answer A. The one‑class‑of‑stock analysis for S corporations centers on whether shares differ in their economic rights to distributions and to liquidation proceeds as set out in the corporation's governing documents and binding agreements. Differences in voting power or isolated unequal cash distributions are not dispositive by themselves; they are relevant only if they reflect or create differing contractual entitlements to distributions or liquidation proceeds. A buy‑sell priced by a book‑value formula may affect a shareholder's economic outcome but does not, by itself, create a second class unless it changes contractual distribution/liquidation rights or is part of an arrangement to circumvent the one‑class requirement.
Why not B: This is tempting because non‑pro rata payments can indicate unequal economic treatment, but the test looks primarily to legal entitlements in governing instruments; unequal payments during a year are evidentiary and not controlling if share rights remain identical.
Why not C: This distractor is attractive because corporate classes often differ by voting power, yet under Subchapter S differing voting or governance rights generally do not create a prohibited second class unless they alter economic distribution or liquidation entitlements.
Why not D: A pricing formula can change a departing shareholder's proceeds, but price mechanics alone do not change the legal rights to distributions or liquidation proceeds unless the terms reallocate those rights or indicate a scheme to circumvent the one‑class rule.
Question 6
Hint
Identify which Year 2 event created an ineligible shareholder and whether a later corrective transfer automatically reverses the tax effect absent express IRS relief.
Answer B. A transfer of S corporation stock to an ineligible shareholder (such as a partnership) causes termination of S status on the date of the disqualifying transfer. Here the Jul. 1 transfer to MM Partners terminated S status. A subsequent transfer back to an eligible shareholder does not automatically reinstate S treatment; to have the election treated as continuing the corporation generally must obtain inadvertent-termination relief under IRC §1362(f), which is subject to statutory and regulatory conditions and is not automatic. The Feb. 1 issuance and Apr. 1 loan, as described, do not independently create the disqualifying conditions in this fact pattern.
Why not A: This is tempting because the Feb. 1 and Apr. 1 events did not themselves create ineligible shareholders or a second class of stock. However, the Jul. 1 transfer to a partnership terminated S status on that date, and a later retransfer does not automatically cure that termination absent relief under §1362(f).
Why not C: This distractor relies on confusion about voting rights. For S status, the critical test is equality of rights to distributions and liquidation proceeds; the fact pattern states the new shares have the same distribution and liquidation rights, so Feb. 1 did not create a second class of stock on these facts.
Why not D: This plays on the rule that some shareholder instruments may be recharacterized as equity. But the stem explicitly describes the Apr. 1 instrument as bona fide debt (written, nonconvertible, market interest, sum certain), so on these facts the loan does not itself terminate S status.
Common questions
Can an S corporation have voting and nonvoting stock?
Yes. Voting differences alone are permitted if every outstanding share has identical rights to distributions and liquidation proceeds.
Do unequal distributions create a second class of S corporation stock?
Not by themselves. Unequal discretionary payments do not create a second class when governing documents and binding agreements preserve identical distribution and liquidation rights.
Does a book-value buy-sell agreement violate the one-class-of-stock rule?
Not by itself. The book-value agreement shown below leaves distribution and liquidation rights unchanged and is not intended to circumvent the one-class requirement.
Watch it solved
A full CPA TCP task-based simulation on S corporations, worked step by step.
Built-In Gains Tax & AAA Ordering | CPA TCP Simulation (TBS) on YouTube
Practice TCP like the real exam
The free ChatCPA simulator: real exam layout, timed testlets, starting with a question on this topic. No account needed to start.
Open the free simulator →More on S corporations
Questions from the ChatCPA bank of 17,658 CPA exam questions, each with a written reason for every wrong answer. ChatCPA is built by Nicholas Miller, CPA (Oregon #14907). How these pages are made. Spot an error? Tell us.