BAR · Business Analysis · 8 practice questions
Maximum Additional Debt Under Coverage and Leverage Covenants
Maximum additional debt is the smaller amount allowed by the coverage and leverage tests. Below: calculate both limits, verify compliance, and fund the remaining need with equity.
Try one first
Hint
Calculate the maximum debt allowed by the interest-coverage covenant and the maximum debt allowed by the 40% debt-to-total-capital target separately, then choose the smaller amount.
Answer D. Compute the maximum debt allowed by each constraint and take the smaller. Interest-coverage: interest ≤ EBIT/3 = $12M/3 = $4M, so debt ≤ $4M / 0.06 = $66,666,667. Debt-to-capital: solve D/(D + $40M) ≤ 0.40 → 0.6D ≤ $16M → D ≤ $26,666,667. The debt-to-capital limit binds, so $26,666,667 is the most supportable amount.
Why not A: If debt equaled $40M with $40M equity, debt/(debt+equity) = 50%, which violates the 40% debt-to-capital constraint. This ignores the stated market-value capital cap.
Why not B: This is the maximum allowed by the interest-coverage covenant alone (EBIT/3 = $4M of interest → $4M/6% = $66.67M). It ignores the separate 40% debt-to-total-capital limit, which is more restrictive here.
Why not C: $4,000,000 is the maximum annual interest expense permitted by the coverage covenant (EBIT/3), not the principal amount of debt. To get principal, divide interest by the 6% rate.
Step by step
- Set up the financing need
Company A needs $150 million, has trailing EBITDA of $150 million, existing debt of $300 million, and annual interest of $30 million; new debt costs 6%. Covenants require debt/EBITDA ≤ 3.0 and EBITDA/interest ≥ 4.0; EBITDA stays unchanged, and new common equity adds neither debt nor interest.
- Find total interest allowed
The coverage covenant permits total annual interest of $150 million ÷ 4 = $37.5 million. This ceiling includes existing and new interest.
- Convert unused interest into debt
Unused interest capacity is $37.5 million − $30 million = $7.5 million. At 6%, that supports $7.5 million ÷ 0.06 = $125 million of additional debt.
- Calculate the leverage limit
Maximum total debt is 3 × $150 million = $450 million. Subtract $300 million of existing debt to get $150 million of additional borrowing capacity.
- Choose the smaller ceiling
Coverage allows $125 million; leverage allows $150 million. Maximum additional debt is $125 million, so coverage is the binding constraint.
- Verify both covenants
At $125 million of new debt, total debt is $425 million and total interest is $37.5 million. Debt/EBITDA is about 2.83, and EBITDA/interest is exactly 4.0, so both tests pass.
- Fill the funding gap
Issue $125 million of debt and $25 million of common equity to raise the required $150 million. An all-debt plan would produce $39 million of interest and coverage of about 3.85, violating the 4.0 minimum.
Key points
- Remember: each covenant sets a separate borrowing ceiling, and the lowest ceiling wins.
- An interest allowance is not debt principal; divide the unused allowance by the new borrowing rate.
- Use EBITDA in this example's coverage test because the covenant explicitly requires it.
- Equity fills the funding gap without adding debt or interest in this example.
How the exam traps you
- Choose $150 million because it passes the leverage test. Coverage permits only $125 million; passing one covenant is not enough.
- Divide the full $37.5 million interest allowance by 6%. Subtract $30 million of existing interest first, leaving $7.5 million for new interest.
- Treat $7.5 million of interest capacity as borrowing capacity. Divide $7.5 million by 6% to obtain $125 million of additional debt.
Question 2
| Plan A | Plan B | |
|---|---|---|
| Debt issued (6% interest) | $800,000 | $200,000 |
| Common equity issued | $1,200,000 | $1,800,000 |
| Required return on equity | 13% | 11% |
Hint
Calculate the after-tax cost of debt, then compute WACC = w_d·r_d(1 − T) + w_e·r_e for each plan using the given issue amounts as market-value weights.
Answer D. After-tax cost of debt = 6% × (1 − 0.21) = 4.74%. For Plan A: w_d = 800k/2,000k = 0.40 and w_e = 0.60, so WACC_A = 0.40×4.74% + 0.60×13% ≈ 9.70%. For Plan B: w_d = 0.10 and w_e = 0.90, so WACC_B = 0.10×4.74% + 0.90×11% ≈ 10.37%. Because WACC_A (≈9.70%) < WACC_B (≈10.37%), Plan A yields the lower WACC.
Why not A: The stem explicitly tells you to treat the issue amounts as market values and to use the stated required returns as the relevant costs of capital, so there is sufficient information to compute and compare WACCs.
Why not B: Tempting because Plan B's equity cost is lower, but WACC depends on weighted average of after-tax debt and equity costs. Plan B's much smaller debt weight reduces the tax-shield benefit, producing a higher overall WACC (≈10.37%) than Plan A (≈9.70%).
Why not C: They are in the same general range, but not essentially the same. Direct calculation shows a meaningful difference: Plan A ≈9.70% versus Plan B ≈10.37%.
Question 3
Hint
Do not stop at the tax advantage of debt. Ask what can limit leverage when a company is already near a covenant boundary.
Answer A. Additional debt can lower a firm's explicit cost of financing and provide a tax shield on interest, which can increase EPS in normal circumstances. However, when leverage is already high and covenant headroom is thin, the resulting increase in financial risk and the chance of distress or covenant violation can outweigh those benefits. Therefore, more debt may not improve the capital structure despite an apparent EPS gain in a normal year.
Why not B: This confuses financing policy with operating performance, debt can affect EPS because it changes interest expense and (after a repurchase) the number of shares outstanding. The flaw in the question is not that debt has no effect on EPS, but that excessive leverage raises risk and covenant concerns.
Why not C: This reverses the usual tax rationale for debt. For corporations, interest generally provides a tax benefit (though subject to statutory limits), so lack of deductibility is not the primary limiting condition here; the limiting issue is elevated financial risk and tight covenant coverage.
Why not D: Even if the net effect on total assets is neutral after borrowing and repurchasing shares, covenants based on ratios (like times-interest-earned) remain relevant because interest expense increases and coverage can be squeezed. A thin cushion above the covenant minimum is precisely why the covenant limits additional debt.
Question 4
Hint
Prioritize the financing source that fits a permanent need without increasing debt at a time when leverage and covenant headroom are already the binding constraints.
Answer B. The project requires permanent capital but the company already exceeds its target leverage and has only narrow covenant headroom; the stem explicitly states any additional borrowing would breach the covenant before the plant contributes. Using the revolver would still increase funded debt and consume a facility needed for seasonal liquidity, and issuing long-term debt is infeasible for the same covenant reason. Issuing equity, despite an unattractive valuation, supplies permanent capital without worsening leverage or risking a covenant violation.
Why not A: This is tempting because bridge financing can be practical, but the revolver counts as debt and, per the stem, any additional borrowing would push the company over its covenant; it would also tie up a facility needed for seasonal working capital and add refinancing risk.
Why not C: Maturity matching is a sound principle, yet the explicit covenant constraint makes new long-term borrowing infeasible: issuing notes would increase funded debt and, by assumption, breach the debt-to-EBITDA covenant before the plant generates earnings.
Why not D: Avoiding issuance might preserve valuation, but the stem states the project is strategically necessary and a commitment must be made within 30 days, so postponement is not an available, best-action alternative under the given facts.
Question 5
Hint
Identify which financing choice best addresses the company's stated priority, not just the cheapest source or the asset-life matching rule.
Answer C. This is best because Lakeview is already above its target leverage, has substantial variable-rate and near-term refinancing exposure, and only thin covenant headroom. Financing a long-lived asset primarily with common equity reduces leverage and lowers the probability of a covenant breach in a downturn while improving flexibility for a cyclical firm. Any additional long-term debt should be used mainly to replace near-term variable-rate borrowings to address maturity and rate risk without increasing overall leverage materially.
Why not A: Tempting because of the lower current nominal rate and apparent flexibility, but wrong because it increases refinancing and interest-rate risk for a long-lived asset. Given the company's large variable-rate exposure, concentrated near-term maturities, and tight covenant cushion, relying on short-term financing would raise the chance of covenant stress in a downturn.
Why not B: Maturity matching is a sound principle, making this attractive, but it ignores the firm's existing overleverage and covenant vulnerability. Issuing long-term debt for the entire project would worsen leverage and increase covenant risk despite better term matching.
Why not D: Preferred stock may seem like a compromise, but it often carries fixed dividend expectations and does not reduce the firm's exposure to near-term variable-rate refinancing risk. Because management is willing to accept dilution to improve flexibility, common equity better addresses the stated objective of lowering capital structure risk and covenant breach probability.
Question 6
Hint
Do not stop at 'debt is cheaper.' Ask which fact in the stem most constrains Mesa before the new plant starts generating cash.
Answer D. Mesa is very near its covenant cap (debt-to-equity 1.92 of a 2.00 limit) and has only modest fixed-charge coverage (2.15x). Because the expansion will not produce meaningful cash for 15 months, adding fixed-payment debt would increase obligations before related inflows arrive and could strain coverage or violate covenants. Therefore the primary issue is financial flexibility and debt capacity (leverage/coverage headroom), not simply the nominal after-tax cost of debt.
Why not A: This is tempting because interest tax shields often make debt appear cheaper than equity. However, when the firm is nearly at its leverage limit and the project delays cash inflows, the ability to service additional fixed obligations and remain within covenants outweighs headline borrowing cost.
Why not B: Avoiding dilution is a valid equity consideration, but it is secondary here: the immediate solvency and covenant risks from adding debt while coverage and cash are thin are more pressing than EPS or voting percentage effects.
Why not C: This distractor over-applies the 'match asset life to financing' heuristic. Long-lived assets can be financed with long-term debt, but the governing question for Mesa is whether it can safely add fixed payments given current leverage and the project's delayed cash generation, not a categorical rule requiring equity.
Question 7
Hint
Do not stop at the nominal cost of debt or expected EPS. Compare interest-coverage headroom under both the expected case and the realistic downside case.
Answer B. Under Plan D, total annual interest would be $1.8 million + $1.4 million = $3.2 million. Expected coverage would be about 3.06x ($9.8 million / $3.2 million), barely above the covenant, while the downside case would fall to about 2.44x ($7.8 million / $3.2 million), implying a likely breach. A lower after-tax cost of debt and possible EPS improvement do not by themselves establish an optimal capital structure when the extra leverage materially reduces flexibility and increases covenant/distress risk.
Why not A: This is tempting because candidates often default to 'debt is cheaper than equity' and stop once the base case clears a covenant. It is wrong because optimal capital structure depends on risk-adjusted tradeoffs, not just stated financing cost or single-scenario compliance. Here, the cushion above 3.0x is minimal and the realistic downside case breaches the covenant.
Why not C: This is tempting because uncertainty does increase the value of financial flexibility and makes excessive leverage more dangerous. It is still wrong because the statement is too absolute: some debt can lower WACC and be part of an optimal structure even when EBIT is uncertain. The better conclusion is not 'debt is always bad,' but that this specific debt plan appears too tight relative to covenant headroom.
Why not D: This distractor matches a common shortcut that confuses EPS accretion with value creation. It is wrong because capital structure affects required returns, financial flexibility, covenant risk, and expected distress costs before any actual default occurs. A plan can raise EPS in some scenarios and still be inferior from a capital-structure perspective.
Question 8
Hint
Compute the pro forma interest coverage (EBIT ÷ total interest) and compare it to the stated covenant; weigh immediate lender remedies/default risk against longer-term theoretical benefits.
Answer D. Pro forma interest expense = $6M (existing) + $16M (new) = $22M. Interest coverage = EBIT / interest = 60 / 22 ≈ 2.73, which is below the covenant minimum of 3.0. That immediate covenant breach can allow lenders to accelerate debt or impose remedies, producing acute liquidity and default risk that outweighs theoretical tax-shield or EPS benefits.
Why not A: Leverage can increase ROE if returns on assets exceed the cost of debt, but any potential EPS or ROE benefit is uncertain and is overshadowed here by the immediate coverage shortfall and attendant default/liquidity risk.
Why not B: This is tempting because more debt can create an interest tax shield, but the stem shows an immediate covenant breach (coverage < 3.0). The near-term default/liquidity risk from violating covenants typically outweighs longer-term WACC benefits.
Why not C: Future dilution is a legitimate concern if debt capacity is exhausted, but it is a speculative, secondary risk here; the facts give a quantifiable, immediate covenant violation that is the more pressing issue.
Common questions
How do you calculate maximum additional debt under an interest coverage covenant?
Divide the required earnings measure by minimum coverage, then subtract existing interest. Divide the remaining interest capacity by the new-debt rate: ($150 million ÷ 4 − $30 million) ÷ 6% = $125 million.
What if debt-to-EBITDA allows more borrowing than interest coverage?
Use the smaller limit. Here, debt-to-EBITDA allows $150 million of additional debt, but coverage limits borrowing to $125 million.
How can a company fund more than its covenant debt capacity?
In this example, issue $125 million of debt and $25 million of equity to meet the $150 million funding need. Equity adds neither debt nor interest under the stated tests.
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