REG · Business Law · 6 practice questions
UCC Firm Offer Rule: Signed Writing and the Three-Month Cap
A merchant's signed written promise to hold a goods offer open can prevent revocation without consideration for up to three months. Sort changes to one desk offer by its hold-open protection or expiration.
Try one first
Hint
Ask whether this is an ordinary option contract or a UCC firm offer, and then check the maximum period of irrevocability without consideration.
Answer B. This is a UCC firm offer: M Co., a merchant, signed a written offer giving assurance it would be held open. Under UCC §2-205, a merchant's signed written assurance that an offer will be held open makes the offer irrevocable without consideration for the time stated, but not for a period longer than three months. Because August 15 falls within three months after June 1, the attempted revocation is ineffective.
Why not A: Tempting because the writing says 120 days, but the UCC caps the no-consideration firm-offer period at three months; a merchant cannot make a firm offer irrevocable beyond that cap without consideration.
Why not C: This reflects a common-law trap, at common law an option requires consideration, but under the UCC a merchant's signed written assurance can create an irrevocable firm offer without consideration for up to three months.
Why not D: This plays on the 'reasonable time' concept, but the firm-offer rule specifically limits irrevocability without consideration to three months; 'reasonable time' does not permit exceeding the statutory three-month cap for a signed firm offer.
Sort it
A merchant's goods offer has the required signed hold-open assurance; both the stated period and three-month cap remain unexpired.
The offer remains open, but statutory firm-offer protection is absent or has ended. Assume no other basis makes the offer irrevocable.
A merchant's goods offer has the required signed hold-open assurance but no stated duration; apply a reasonable time, capped at three months.
The offer's stated expiration has passed; the three-month cap does not extend it.
| Item | Goes to |
|---|---|
| On June 1, M Co., an office-furniture merchant, signs only the signature line on its own form offering Buyer, a retailer, 100 desks for $50,000: 'Offer expires October 1 and will be held open until then.' Buyer gives no consideration and has not accepted. Classify the offer on August 1. | Irrevocable offerM Co.'s signed hold-open promise qualifies. August 1 is within three months of June 1. |
| Same facts, except M Co. never signs the written offer. Classify it on August 1. | Revocable offerAn unsigned writing does not satisfy the firm-offer signature requirement. |
| Same facts, except the classification date is September 15. Classify the offer. | Revocable offerStatutory protection ended after three months. The October 1 expiration has not passed, so the offer remains revocable. |
| Same facts, except the writing promises to hold the offer open but states no duration or expiration date. Classify the protection on August 1. | Reasonable-time test neededNo duration is stated. Apply a reasonable time, capped at three months; August 1 alone cannot settle revocability. |
| Same facts, except M Co. is not a merchant. Classify the offer on August 1. | Revocable offerThe offeror must be a merchant. A nonmerchant's signed assurance does not create statutory firm-offer protection. |
| Same facts, except Buyer supplies the form M Co. signs. Classify the offer on August 1. | Revocable offerThe recipient supplied the form. M Co.'s ordinary signature is insufficient without a separate signature on the assurance. |
| Same facts, except Buyer is a consumer rather than a retailer. Classify the offer on August 1. | Irrevocable offerThe recipient's merchant status does not matter. Only M Co., the offeror, must be a merchant. |
| Same facts, except the offer expires July 1 and promises to stay open until then. Classify it on August 1. | Expired offerJuly 1 is the stated expiration. Three months is a maximum, not a required offer period. |
| Same facts, except M Co. makes the entire offer orally rather than in a signed writing. Classify it on August 1. | Revocable offerAn oral hold-open promise does not satisfy the signed-writing requirement. |
| Same facts, except M Co. expressly reserves the right to revoke instead of promising to hold the offer open. Classify it on August 1. | Revocable offerA merchant's signature alone is insufficient. The writing must assure that the offer will stay open. |
| Same facts, except M Co. offers to buy the 100 desks from Buyer for $50,000 instead of selling them. Classify it on August 1. | Irrevocable offerBuying instead of selling does not matter. A merchant's qualifying offer to buy goods also receives firm-offer protection. |
Key points
- Remember: Three months caps protection from revocation, not the offer's life.
- Only the offeror must be a merchant; the recipient need not be one.
- On a form supplied by the recipient, the merchant must separately sign the hold-open assurance.
How the exam traps you
- Treating the promised October 1 date as guaranteed protection beyond three months. Without consideration, statutory firm-offer protection cannot exceed three months.
- Treating the offer as automatically terminated after three months. The offer becomes revocable but remains open until revoked or expired.
- Treating any merchant-signed offer as firm. Look for a hold-open assurance and, on a recipient-supplied form, a separate signature on that assurance.
Question 2
Hint
Apply the predominant-purpose test named in the stem and assess the transaction as a whole, compare the economic allocation and the contract's wording rather than focusing only on the disputed item.
Answer C. Under the predominant-purpose test, courts evaluate the contract's overall character by weighing factors such as price allocation between goods and services, the seller's primary business, the contract language describing the transaction, and the relative importance of the services. Here the contract allocates $720,000 (80%) to equipment, emphasizes furnishing and delivery, and TempPro primarily sells HVAC units, installation appears incidental. Those combined factors support treating the agreement principally as a sale of goods, so Article 2 governs.
Why not A: This distractor is attractive because specialized or technical services can be significant in mixed contracts. It fails because specialized labor is only one factor; the heavy economic allocation to equipment, the contract wording, and TempPro's goods-selling business indicate goods predominate here.
Why not B: This distractor tempts by focusing on the defective component (compressors), which intuitively points to goods-law rules. It fails here because the problem specifies the predominant-purpose test, under which the character of the entire contract, not only the subject of the complaint, controls.
Why not D: This choice tempts by relying on a clear numerical allocation, which is strong evidence of the contract's nature. It is incorrect because allocation alone is not necessarily dispositive under the predominant-purpose inquiry; courts weigh allocation alongside other factors (seller's business, contract language, and the importance of services).
Question 3
Hint
First determine whether Delta accepted the goods by installation. Then choose the Article 2 remedy that addresses a postacceptance substantial nonconformity when the buyer accepted in reliance on the seller’s promise to cure.
Answer A. Delta accepted the goods by taking and installing the machine, so preacceptance rejection is not available. Under UCC 2-608 (revocation of acceptance), a buyer may revoke acceptance when a nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods and the buyer accepted in reasonable belief the seller would cure but the seller failed to make a timely cure. Revocation must be prompt after discovery and the buyer must notify the seller; doing so is Delta's best way to return the machine and avoid paying the remaining price.
Why not B: Tempting because the perfect-tender concept allows rejection of nonconforming goods prior to acceptance. It fails here because Delta already accepted the machine by installing it, so rejection is not the available remedy, revocation of acceptance, not preacceptance rejection, applies.
Why not C: Tempting because specific performance can be appropriate for unique goods when damages are inadequate. It fails because the facts do not show the machine is truly unique or that replacement/monetary damages are unavailable; the UCC revocation remedy is the direct remedy for a postacceptance substantial impairment caused by a failed promised cure.
Why not D: Tempting because a buyer's use can affect remedies and withholding payment may seem practical. It fails because withholding payment is not the formal mechanism to undo acceptance; installation/use does not automatically bar revocation when the buyer accepted in reliance on a promised cure that was not made, the buyer must timely revoke acceptance and notify the seller under UCC 2-608.
Question 4
Hint
Use the default UCC risk-of-loss rule for a sale with no breach and no special delivery term. Ask whether the seller is a merchant and whether the buyer has actually received the goods.
Answer A. Under UCC §2-509, when the seller is a merchant and there is no contrary agreement or breach, risk of loss passes to the buyer only upon the buyer's receipt of the goods. Taylor had not yet taken physical possession, so Metro (the merchant seller) retained the risk of loss.
Why not B: Tender or making goods available matters in some contexts, but for a merchant seller in a non-carrier sale risk passes only when the buyer actually receives the goods; availability for pickup is not the same as receipt.
Why not C: Payment alone does not shift risk of loss under the UCC; the governing rule here is merchant status and the buyer's receipt, not whether the buyer has paid.
Why not D: The UCC does not default to splitting accidental loss; it allocates risk based on specific rules. Here the rule places the risk with the merchant seller until buyer receipt.
Question 5
Hint
Apply the buyer's perfect-tender right first, then ask whether the seller still has time to perform and what remedies that allows.
Answer C. Under UCC Article 2, when the time for performance has not yet expired the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of an intent to cure and then make a conforming delivery within the contract time. Here Manufacturer can deliver conforming replacements by June 25, which is before the June 30 deadline, so Manufacturer should seasonably notify Retailer and cure to preserve the contract. A buyer's initial rejection does not automatically eliminate the seller's right to cure while the performance period remains.
Why not A: This choice tempts because it echoes a common-law substantial-performance idea (if most goods conform, accept the shipment). It fails under the UCC: for a single-delivery sale the buyer may reject nonconforming goods and the seller cannot force acceptance; the seller's proper remedy when time remains is to seasonably notify and cure.
Why not B: This is tempting because the buyer has a strong right to reject nonconforming goods. It is incorrect because rejection does not automatically terminate the seller's obligations when the contract time for performance has not expired; the seller may preserve the contract by timely notice and cure.
Why not D: This distractor tempts by suggesting rejection gives the seller extra time. It is wrong: there is no automatic extension of the contract deadline simply because the buyer rejected; post-deadline cure is only allowed in limited circumstances, and here Manufacturer can cure before the June 30 deadline so waiting would risk losing the cure remedy.
Question 6
Hint
Start with the UCC statute of frauds rule, then ask whether the facts fit a recognized exception based on the nature of the goods and the seller's actions.
Answer D. This fits the specially manufactured goods exception to the UCC statute of frauds. The mugs were customized with Buyer's logo and not suitable for ordinary resale, and Seller had already begun production and made procurement commitments before Buyer's cancellation. Under these facts, the lack of a signed writing does not bar enforcement.
Why not A: Partial payment or acceptance can enforce an oral contract to that limited extent, but those facts are absent here. The contract is enforceable under a different UCC exception, the specially manufactured goods rule, which permits full enforcement in these circumstances.
Why not B: This overgeneralizes the UCC rule. While the UCC generally requires a writing for goods priced at $500 or more, there are recognized exceptions (for example, specially manufactured goods) that make an oral contract enforceable despite the absence of a signed writing.
Why not C: This describes the merchant confirmatory memo exception, which is real and can make an oral agreement enforceable between merchants. However, it is not the only exception; the facts here satisfy the specially manufactured goods exception without relying on a confirmatory memo.
Common questions
What makes an offer a UCC firm offer?
A merchant must make an offer for goods in a signed writing that assures it will stay open. If the recipient supplies the form, the merchant must separately sign the assurance.
Can a UCC firm offer be irrevocable for more than three months?
Not under the firm-offer rule alone. Without consideration, statutory irrevocability cannot exceed three months.
Does a UCC firm offer automatically expire after three months?
No. M Co.'s offer becomes revocable after three months, but it remains open before October 1 unless revoked.
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