ISC · Security and Confidentiality and Privacy · 7 practice questions
Stolen Credentials: When MFA Is the Best Mitigation
Multifactor authentication makes a stolen password alone insufficient to log in. Below, compare responses to a phishing incident and identify the control that directly changes the login requirement.
Try one first
Hint
Focus on the control that still works even after a password has already been stolen.
Answer A. Multifactor authentication most directly mitigates the stated risk because a stolen password alone would not be sufficient to log in. The attackers used valid credentials obtained by phishing and did not exploit the portal software, so adding an additional authentication factor addresses the root cause. Other controls may help overall security but would not by themselves prevent access with known credentials.
Why not B: Stronger or longer passwords reduce the chance of guessing or brute-force attacks, but they do not stop an attacker who already possesses a valid password from logging in. Because the credentials were obtained via phishing, increasing length does not directly mitigate the described access risk.
Why not C: Phishing training can reduce how often employees fall for attacks, but its effectiveness varies and it is a preventive measure. It does not ensure that stolen credentials cannot be used to access the portal after they have already been compromised.
Why not D: Encryption in transit protects against network interception of credentials, but the scenario indicates the attackers obtained credentials through phishing rather than eavesdropping. Encryption would not prevent an attacker from logging in with valid stolen credentials.
What should you do?
The situation
Lake Co. employees access a cloud accounting system using only usernames and passwords. Attackers used passwords captured by phishing to log in successfully. The system is patched, uses TLS, and has properly assigned access rights. IT reviews login logs weekly. Management wants the control that most directly reduces future access using stolen passwords alone. Which response is best?
Require multifactor authentication for all accounting-system logins.
Best An additional independent factor makes the stolen password alone insufficient to complete login.
Increase password length and require more frequent password changes instead.
Wrong Attackers can immediately use a phished current password, regardless of its length or scheduled replacement.
Review login logs daily instead of weekly without changing authentication.
Wrong More frequent review may detect suspicious logins sooner, but it does not prevent them.
Rely on TLS to prevent attackers from signing in with captured passwords.
Wrong TLS encrypts the connection. It does not distinguish an employee from an attacker presenting the same password.
Review employee access rights more frequently without changing authentication.
Wrong Rights are already appropriate. Reviewing permissions does not stop an attacker from authenticating with a stolen password.
Key points
- Remember: A harder password does not help when the attacker already knows it; MFA requires something beyond that password.
- Log review detects suspicious access; MFA changes what an attacker needs to gain access.
- Correct permissions limit what an account can do, not who can sign in with its password.
How the exam traps you
- Choose longer passwords or scheduled password changes because the incident involved passwords. Target misuse of a known password, not password guessing.
- Choose more frequent log reviews as the best way to prevent stolen-password logins. Monitoring can detect access without blocking the initial login.
- Choose stronger TLS protection because the system is accessed over the internet. TLS protects data in transit; it does not add an authentication factor.
Question 2
Hint
Think about what action immediately prevents the attacker from continuing to use stolen credentials before broader remediation or notifications.
Answer D. The immediate priority is containment: revoke potentially compromised credentials and end active sessions to stop further unauthorized access. Requiring MFA for vendor accounts addresses the access weakness that enabled the breach, and focused log review and monitoring determine the scope and inform next steps such as notifications or remediation.
Why not A: Contract termination and legal action are longer-term, punitive or recovery measures that do not immediately mitigate ongoing unauthorized access and can complicate remediation efforts. Containment and investigation should come first.
Why not B: Notifying employees and offering credit monitoring are important, but doing so before containing ongoing access may allow the attacker to continue exploiting the account. Notification is typically done after containment and initial scope assessment.
Why not C: Reimaging and restoring systems can be necessary later, but these steps are slow and may not be feasible for a third party. They do not immediately stop credential-based access to the cloud service, so containment of credentials is higher priority.
Question 3
Hint
Choose a preventive control that can be deployed quickly, affordably, and that works with personal (BYOD) devices.
Answer D. MFA is a preventive control that materially reduces the likelihood of unauthorized remote access even when passwords are compromised and works on personal devices, so it can be rolled out quickly and at relatively low cost. Given the weeks-long timeline, constrained budget, and remaining BYOD situation, full MFA directly addresses the objective to lower probability and meet common regulatory/access-control expectations.
Why not A: Improved detection and response reduce impact and dwell time, which is tempting if resources are limited, but these are detective controls; they do not prevent initial unauthorized access and therefore do not best satisfy the management objective to rapidly lower the probability of a breach.
Why not B: This distractor is tempting because targeting high-risk users is faster and cheaper than organization-wide rollout. However, it leaves a large portion of users unprotected, so the overall likelihood of unauthorized access would not be reduced to the same extent as full MFA, and it may not satisfy regulatory/internal-control requirements for protecting financial data.
Why not C: Controlling endpoints is attractive because it addresses BYOD-related device risk, but procuring, imaging, and distributing company laptops plus MDM at this scale is costly and time-consuming and unlikely to meet the weeks-long timeline or constrained budget, so it fails the feasibility requirement.
Question 4
Hint
Focus on the specific risk named in the stem and ask which control directly lowers that risk, rather than helping with recovery or monitoring.
Answer B. The primary risk described is stolen credentials leading to unauthorized access to confidential files. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is a preventive control that requires more than a password, so a stolen password alone is insufficient to gain access. Encryption protects data in transit and at rest but does not stop an attacker who can authenticate with stolen credentials from downloading files.
Why not A: Backups and recovery improve availability, not confidentiality. They do not prevent an attacker with valid credentials from accessing and downloading confidential data, so they do not address the stated threat.
Why not C: While MFA lowers the chance of unauthorized access, it does not eliminate all threats or the possibility of misuse by legitimate accounts. Detective controls like log monitoring remain necessary to detect suspicious activity that preventive controls may not stop.
Why not D: Authentication verifies identity or access rights but does not change the classification of the data. Files remain confidential even after a user signs in, so this option reflects a misunderstanding of authentication versus data classification.
Question 5
Hint
Focus on the control that still works even when the password itself is already known by an attacker.
Answer B. Multifactor authentication adds a second verification factor (something the user has or is) beyond the password. Even if an attacker knows a valid password due to reuse or compromise, they still cannot log in without the second factor, so MFA most directly reduces the risk of unauthorized access.
Why not A: Stronger or longer passwords reduce guessing and brute-force risk, which is why this choice is tempting. However, if an attacker already has a valid password because of reuse or compromise, increasing length does not stop that attacker from using the known credentials.
Why not C: Encryption at rest protects stored data if media or systems are accessed or stolen, so it is an important confidentiality control. It does not, however, prevent an attacker from signing in with valid credentials and accessing data through the application layer, so it doesn't directly mitigate account takeover from exposed passwords.
Why not D: Backups support recovery and availability after data loss or corruption, which makes them valuable operationally. They do not prevent unauthorized logins or stop an attacker who has a compromised password from accessing accounts, so they are not the best control for this specific risk.
Question 6
Hint
Focus on the control that still protects the system even if an attacker already knows a valid password.
Answer C. Require multifactor authentication (MFA). MFA requires an additional verification factor beyond a password (for example, a one-time code or hardware token), so a stolen or reused password alone will not permit access. Because the scenario describes attackers using credentials exposed in third-party breaches, MFA most directly prevents unauthorized logins; the other options address different security needs but do not stop account takeover when passwords are compromised.
Why not A: Encryption at rest protects stored data if storage media or servers are accessed or stolen, but it does not prevent an attacker from logging into the CRM with valid credentials and viewing data via the application. The primary risk in this scenario is authentication, not data-at-rest exposure.
Why not B: Stronger password requirements can reduce some types of credential compromise, but the stem assumes attackers are using valid passwords leaked elsewhere. Increasing length or complexity does not prevent an attacker who already has a legitimate password from authenticating.
Why not D: Backups support recovery and availability after data loss or ransomware, but they do not reduce the chance that an attacker with compromised credentials can log in and access data. Backups address recovery, not prevention of unauthorized access.
Question 7
Hint
Consider which control most directly prevents access when credentials are compromised and can be rolled out first for high‑risk accounts.
Answer A. Phishing enabled credential theft, and MFA prevents account takeover because possession of a password alone is insufficient for access. Prioritizing MFA for cloud and remote-access accounts, starting with high‑privilege/finance users, and using conditional access for risky networks is a high-impact, practical mitigation that can be staged quickly while the forensic investigation proceeds.
Why not B: B tempts because understanding root cause helps design long-term fixes, but it is wrong here: waiting to implement proven mitigations keeps users exposed. Forensic analysis should proceed in parallel with rapid deployment of high‑impact protections such as MFA.
Why not C: C is tempting since credentials were compromised, but password resets and stricter rotation do not stop phishing, credential replay, or use of stolen credentials alone. These measures are weaker than MFA at preventing account takeover.
Why not D: D may appeal because it reduces immediate financial risk, but it addresses only a single capability and leaves the underlying account‑takeover vulnerability across the organization unaddressed; it may also cause operational disruption if used as the sole fix.
Common questions
Why is MFA better than password complexity for stolen credentials?
Phishing can capture a valid password regardless of its complexity. MFA requires an additional independent factor, so knowing that password alone is insufficient.
Does TLS prevent attackers from using stolen passwords?
No. TLS protects the connection, but an attacker can still submit a stolen password through that encrypted connection.
Does MFA eliminate the need to review login logs?
No. MFA reduces the likelihood of unauthorized access using stolen passwords; it does not eliminate every account-compromise risk. Log review remains useful for detecting suspicious activity.
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