ISC · Security and Confidentiality and Privacy · 6 practice questions
Risk Responses: Mitigation, Transfer, Acceptance, Avoidance
Risk responses reduce exposure, shift loss, retain risk without further treatment, or stop the risky activity. Sort Harbor's proposed responses for a portal that stores customer Social Security numbers.
Try one first
Hint
Focus on whether management is reducing the risk, transferring it, accepting it as-is, or eliminating the activity that creates it.
Answer D. This is risk mitigation because management is taking actions (encrypting data at rest and restricting access) to reduce the likelihood and/or impact of unauthorized access while continuing the activity. Those controls lower exposure without eliminating or shifting the underlying risk.
Why not A: Tempting because the company continues the process despite the risk. However, acceptance means knowingly living with the risk without implementing meaningful controls; here management implemented encryption and access controls, so they are not simply accepting the risk.
Why not B: Tempting because the company is responding proactively, but avoidance means stopping or not engaging in the risky activity. Management kept the process and instead implemented controls, which is mitigation rather than avoidance.
Why not C: Tempting if candidates conflate protection with transferring responsibility. Risk transfer involves shifting financial or legal exposure to another party (for example, via insurance or outsourcing). The fact pattern states management did not outsource the risk or buy insurance.
Sort it
Does the response reduce likelihood or impact while the risky activity continues?
Does the response shift covered financial loss to another party?
Does management retain the risk without further treatment?
Does the response stop the risky activity entirely?
| Item | Goes to |
|---|---|
| Require phishing-resistant MFA for help-desk users while keeping the portal operating. | MitigationMFA reduces the likelihood that stolen credentials alone allow unauthorized access. |
| Purchase cyber insurance covering certain breach-response costs, without changing portal controls. | TransferThe insurer reimburses covered losses; purchasing coverage does not secure the portal. |
| Keep existing portal controls and knowingly retain the remaining exposure without additional treatment. | AcceptanceAcceptance concerns the risk retained after existing controls, not the absence of all controls. |
| Stop optional SSN collection but continue operating the portal and retaining required SSNs. | MitigationFewer retained SSNs reduce potential exposure, but the risky activity continues. |
| Permanently discontinue the portal's SSN-processing service and securely remove all SSNs from that service. | AvoidanceHarbor ends the activity creating this portal exposure rather than operating it with stronger controls. |
| Increase cyber-insurance limits while leaving the portal and its controls unchanged. | TransferHigher limits shift more covered financial loss, not the underlying likelihood of unauthorized access. |
| Restrict help-desk permissions so only designated users can export SSNs. | MitigationRestricting export permissions reduces opportunities for unauthorized disclosure while the portal remains in use. |
| Formally approve retaining the portal's remaining risk, with no new controls, insurance, or service changes. | AcceptanceManagement knowingly retains the exposure without further treatment. |
| Deploy DLP that blocks portal exports containing SSNs to personal cloud storage. | MitigationBlocking unauthorized transfers reduces the likelihood of successful exfiltration. |
| Add MFA and export restrictions, plus insurance for certain breach costs; classify the primary response. | MitigationThe operational response reduces exposure. Insurance supplements it with limited transfer of financial consequences. |
Key points
- Remember: Classify what management does to the risk, not merely whether the portal stays open.
- A response can combine treatments: added controls are mitigation, while insurance adds limited transfer.
- Acceptance can retain existing controls; it does not require an uncontrolled system.
How the exam traps you
- Calling continued portal operation acceptance even when management adds controls. New controls that reduce likelihood or impact indicate mitigation.
- Calling the entire response transfer because management buys insurance alongside controls. Separate the treatments: controls mitigate; insurance transfers covered financial losses.
- Calling reduced SSN collection avoidance of the entire portal risk. If the portal still stores SSNs, reduced collection mitigates exposure rather than stopping the risky activity.
Question 2
Hint
Focus on what segmentation changes after one system is already compromised, not on what would stop the initial infection.
Answer B. Network segmentation is a containment control that restricts traffic between segments. If a workstation is compromised, properly enforced segmentation limits lateral movement and helps confine the incident to that segment, reducing potential impact on accounting and production systems. It does not, however, stop the initial infection itself.
Why not A: This is tempting because segmentation is a security control, and candidates may over-credit any control as preventing attacks. However, segmentation mainly limits post-compromise movement between systems; it does not stop the original malware from being delivered or executed on the workstation. Controls like email filtering, endpoint protection, and user training are aimed at preventing initial infections.
Why not C: This confuses network segmentation with encryption. Making stored data unreadable is the effect of encryption at rest or full-disk encryption, not network segmentation. Segmentation controls which systems can communicate, not whether files on a device are encrypted.
Why not D: Segmentation reduces the scope of lateral movement but does not detect compromises. Organizations still need logging and monitoring to identify suspicious activity and respond promptly; segmentation complements but does not replace detection.
Question 3
Hint
Focus on what risk still exists now, not just how serious the issue looked before current controls were considered.
Answer B. Remediation priority should be driven by residual risk, the exposure that remains after current controls are considered. Assessing the likelihood and potential impact to sensitive data tells management what the organization is actually still at risk for, which should guide where limited remediation resources go first.
Why not A: Inherent risk is a useful starting point, but it ignores controls already in place. Prioritizing solely on original exposure can waste effort on issues that compensating controls have already largely mitigated.
Why not C: Operational efficiency matters, but speed alone can leave higher-residual-risk issues unaddressed. Quick wins are valuable but should not override addressing the greatest remaining risks to sensitive data.
Why not D: A first-in, first-out approach may feel orderly, but security remediation should be risk-based. An older finding with low residual risk should not block remediation of a newer, higher-risk gap.
Question 4
Hint
Calculate expected loss = probability × $1,000,000 for each technical option, add the stated mitigation or premium cost, and remember insurance excludes regulatory fines (so retained loss per breach remains higher).
Answer B. Compute expected total cost = expected loss (probability × $1,000,000) plus mitigation/premium cost. With the patch: expected loss = 0.05 × $1,000,000 = $50,000; add $60,000 → $110,000 total. Insurance leaves the company retaining 10% of direct losses ($80,000) plus the $200,000 fines (excluded), so expected retained loss = 0.30 × $280,000 = $84,000; add $120,000 premium → $204,000. The WAF yields $150,000 expected loss + $80,000 maintenance = $230,000, and accepting yields $300,000; the patch minimizes expected total cost.
Why not A: Tempting because it transfers most of the large direct remediation cost to the insurer, but it's wrong because the policy excludes fines and leaves a retained share of direct loss; after accounting for retained loss and the premium the expected total (~$204,000) is higher than the patch option (~$110,000).
Why not C: Tempting because a WAF is a non-invasive, ongoing control that reduces exploit probability, but it's wrong here because the combination of residual expected loss at 15% and the recurring $80,000 cost yields a higher total expected cost (~$230,000) than the patch.
Why not D: Tempting if management wants to avoid near-term spending or fears patch disruption, but it's wrong because the expected loss at the current 30% probability (0.30 × $1,000,000 = $300,000) is substantially higher than the cost of the patch and other mitigations.
Question 5
Hint
Focus on when an organization is expected to respond to an unacceptable confidentiality risk, not on when damage is confirmed.
Answer D. Mitigation is required when an identified risk exceeds the organization's approved tolerance and no exception has been granted. In this scenario the security team identified an above-tolerance confidentiality exposure during pre-launch testing, so mitigation must begin before the repository goes into production. Waiting for exploitation or for a later review would leave employee tax records unprotected.
Why not A: This confuses mitigation with a fallback after elimination attempts fail. Mitigation should begin when risk is above tolerance regardless of whether full elimination is possible; compensating controls or configuration changes should be applied promptly.
Why not B: This is tempting because some candidates associate action with proof of harm. However, policy requires reducing above-tolerance risks proactively; mitigation should not wait until a breach confirms the exposure was exploited.
Why not C: This distractor assumes routine review cycles are the proper trigger. An identified above-tolerance exposure requires timely remediation, especially before production use, not deferral to a periodic review.
Question 6
Hint
Focus on the specific way the compromise is expected to occur, and ask which consideration best addresses that path before the data is exposed.
Answer C. The governing consideration is whether a mitigation materially reduces residual risk for the specific credible threat scenario. Here the threat is compromised help-desk credentials used through the normal application, so a control that interrupts that attack path (for example, phishing-resistant MFA for help-desk users) is the most relevant. Controls that mainly transfer loss, aid investigation, or protect only stored-at-rest data that the application can decrypt will not materially lower the residual export risk.
Why not A: Improved logging and SIEM rules improve detection and support forensics after an incident, which is valuable, but they do not necessarily prevent or materially reduce the likelihood of the identified export scenario. Since the objective is to reduce security, confidentiality, and privacy risk to within tolerance, preventive risk reduction on the attack path should govern.
Why not B: Encryption at rest is often a strong control, but the facts state the attacker would act through the application and that the application can decrypt records it is authorized to display. Because that mitigation does not interrupt the identified credential-based export path, choosing it based solely on being a strong stored-data safeguard would not best meet management's objective of lowering residual risk on the actual attack path.
Why not D: Transferring financial consequences (for example, via insurance) or choosing the cheapest immediate fix may reduce net expected loss, but it does not reduce the likelihood that sensitive records will be accessed or exported via compromised credentials. Because management's goal is to reduce the underlying security and privacy exposure, financial transfer or short-term cost considerations should not be the governing factor.
Common questions
What is the difference between risk mitigation and risk acceptance?
Mitigation adds measures that reduce likelihood or impact. Acceptance retains the remaining risk without further treatment, even when existing controls remain.
Is cyber insurance risk mitigation or risk transfer?
Purchasing cyber insurance is risk transfer because it shifts covered financial losses. If Harbor also adds portal controls, the response combines mitigation and transfer.
Does collecting fewer Social Security numbers count as risk avoidance?
Not for the overall portal exposure if Harbor continues storing some SSNs. Reducing collection mitigates potential impact; ending the risky activity is avoidance.
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