REG · Business Law · 9 practice questions
Ending Apparent Authority: Who to Notify and How
To end apparent authority, give prior dealers actual notice and use reasonably targeted public notice for others who knew of the agency. Below: follow one termination from revocation through a supplier's later order.
Try one first
Hint
Focus on the difference between ending authority as between principal and agent versus ending authority as it appears to a third party who has dealt with the agent before.
Answer B. When a third party has previously dealt with an agent, the principal must give actual (direct) notice to that third party to terminate the agent's apparent authority as to that party. Delta told Lane but did not notify OfficePro, which had an established course of dealing and therefore could reasonably rely on Lane's authority. Without actual notice to OfficePro, Delta risks being bound by Lane's July 3 order.
Why not A: Constructive notice (e.g., a public announcement) can be sufficient for persons who did not have prior dealings with the agent, but it does not cut off apparent authority as to a specific third party that previously relied on the agent. Because OfficePro previously dealt with Lane, Delta needed to notify OfficePro directly.
Why not C: Telling the agent ends the agent's actual authority, but apparent authority can persist as to third parties who reasonably believe the agency still exists. OfficePro's prior dealings with Lane mean Delta also had to give OfficePro actual notice.
Why not D: Whether Lane signs a written contract is irrelevant to cutting off apparent authority; the key is whether the third party knows the agent's authority has ended. Without direct notice to OfficePro, Delta may still be bound by acts within the appearance of Lane's prior authority.
Step by step
- End actual authority
Mesa terminates purchasing agent Lane on June 1. Lane's actual authority ends, but outsiders may still reasonably believe Lane can act for Mesa.
- Identify the prior dealer
Atlas previously sold inventory to Mesa through Lane. That course of dealing supports Atlas's reasonable reliance on Lane for another ordinary inventory order.
- Send direct notice
Mesa mails Atlas a direct revocation notice on June 1. Atlas needs actual notice because it previously dealt with Lane on Mesa's behalf.
- Correct the public appearance
Mesa also removes Lane from its website and publishes termination in a regional trade journal. For sellers who knew of Lane's agency but had no prior dealings, publication reasonably calculated to reach them supplies constructive notice.
- Check receipt and actual knowledge
Atlas receives the direct notice June 4 and has no knowledge of termination before Lane's June 2 routine order. Had Atlas actually read the public notice before contracting, that knowledge would defeat reasonable reliance.
- Apply the notice cutoff
Mesa is bound on Atlas's June 2 order through apparent authority, even though Lane's actual authority ended June 1. The June 4 notice cuts off Atlas's reasonable reliance for later orders, not the earlier contract.
Key points
- Remember: Firing the agent ends actual authority, but an uninformed prior dealer may still bind the principal.
- Actual knowledge defeats reliance even when the prior dealer learns of termination by reading a public notice.
- Strangers can be charged with constructive notice even if they never read the publication.
How the exam traps you
- Firing Lane automatically ends all authority. Actual authority ends, but apparent authority can continue as to Atlas.
- Publishing in a trade journal notifies every seller sufficiently. Publication can cover strangers, but it does not replace actual notice to an unaware prior dealer.
- Mailing the notice ends apparent authority immediately. Compare Atlas's receipt date with the contract date, not the mailing date.
Question 2
Hint
Focus on what SupplyCo was told or allowed to believe by GreenCo, not just on the private instruction Dana received.
Answer B. This is an apparent authority question. Although Dana violated a private limit on actual authority, GreenCo had held Dana out as the person who handles equipment purchases. If SupplyCo reasonably relied on that manifestation and did not know of the private restriction, apparent authority can bind GreenCo without ratification or written authority.
Why not A: Tempting because of the private limit, but actual (internal) limits do not defeat apparent authority when the principal's conduct leads a third party to reasonably believe the agent is authorized.
Why not C: Ratification can bind a principal, but it's not required here because the facts support apparent authority based on GreenCo's representations to SupplyCo.
Why not D: This distractor incorrectly implies that authority must be written. Apparent authority arises from the principal's words or conduct toward the third party, not from a separate written internal authorization.
Question 3
Hint
Separate actual authority from apparent authority, and ask what each supplier knew because of Patco's conduct, not because of Rivera's own statements.
Answer D. Patco's actual authority over Rivera ended when Patco terminated Rivera on June 1. However, apparent (ostensible) authority can persist as to third parties who reasonably rely on the principal's prior manifestations, here, X had a two-year course of dealing and consistent payment by Patco that supported a reasonable belief Rivera retained purchasing authority for similar office supplies. Y had no principal-based manifestation to rely on and relied only on Rivera's own assertion, which is not enough to create apparent authority against Patco.
Why not A: This distractor correctly notes that apparent authority can continue until a third party receives notice, but it errs by treating a third party's bare reliance on the agent's statement as sufficient. Apparent authority must be traceable to the principal's manifestations (e.g., prior course of dealing), which Y lacked.
Why not B: This answer mistakes the end of actual authority for the automatic end of all binding effects. Even after actual authority ends, apparent authority may still bind the principal as to third parties who reasonably rely on the principal's prior manifestations and have not been notified of the termination, which distinguishes X from Y.
Why not C: This reverses the correct analysis. Prior dealings and Patco's consistent payment to X support X's reasonable belief in Rivera's authority (making apparent authority likely as to X). Y's mere lack of notice is insufficient where there was no principal-based manifestation that Rivera could bind Patco for resale inventory.
Question 4
Hint
Focus on what Vendor reasonably understood from Atlas's communications and prior conduct, not just on Atlas's private instructions to Nunez.
Answer C. Atlas created apparent authority by designating Nunez as Vendor's primary contact and by accepting and paying multiple similar orders without objection. Vendor reasonably relied on those manifestations and had no notice of the undisclosed $25,000 internal limit, so Atlas is bound to the contract even though Nunez exceeded actual authority and may have breached duties to Atlas.
Why not A: This focuses on actual (internal) authority, which Nunez did lack. However, apparent authority, based on the principal's outward manifestations to the third party, controls whether the principal is bound, and Atlas's communications and prior acceptance made Vendor's belief reasonable.
Why not B: An agent might face personal liability in some circumstances, but the existence of apparent authority means the principal (Atlas) can also be held to the contract. The facts point to Atlas's manifestations creating liability for Atlas, not exclusive personal liability for Nunez.
Why not D: Ratification is one mechanism to bind a principal after an unauthorized act, but it is unnecessary here because apparent authority existed at the time of contracting due to Atlas's conduct and prior acceptance of similar orders.
Question 5
Hint
Analyze the transaction in sequence: authority at signing first, then the principal's later conduct after learning all key facts.
Answer B. Nora lacked authority and SecureGuard's knowledge defeats apparent authority, but a principal may ratify an unauthorized act. Ratification can be implied by conduct, such as allowing performance to begin and paying the invoice with knowledge of the material facts and before the third party withdrew. Those acts bind Pecan to the contract.
Why not A: Tempting because SecureGuard's knowledge does negate apparent authority, but it ignores that the principal later, with knowledge of the key facts, accepted performance and paid, conduct that amounts to ratification and binds the principal.
Why not C: This distractor relies on the mistaken belief that ratification must be express. Ratification may be implied from conduct (e.g., permitting performance and accepting benefits) and does not require an express statement.
Why not D: Incorrect because an unauthorized act by an agent is not necessarily a permanent nullity; a principal may later adopt (ratify) the transaction, and ratification does not require new consideration to create the principal's liability.
Question 6
Hint
For apparent authority, ask whose conduct matters to the third party's reasonable belief.
Answer C. Apparent authority depends on the principal's words or conduct toward the third party and whether those manifestations reasonably caused the third party to believe the agent had authority. Here, Pine's email and prior dealings are the controlling facts; a private limitation unknown to Retailer does not prevent apparent authority.
Why not A: Students often focus on the agent's words, but an agent cannot generally create apparent authority solely by asserting authority; the principal must by words or conduct lead the third party to believe the agent has that power.
Why not B: This is tempting because internal instructions affect actual authority between principal and agent. But apparent authority turns on what the third party reasonably understood from the principal's manifestations; a private, undisclosed limit does not bind an innocent third party.
Why not D: An agent's subjective belief or good faith about the principal's interests is irrelevant to apparent authority, which depends on the principal's outward manifestations and the third party's reasonable interpretation.
Question 7
Hint
Focus on the difference between ending authority internally and cutting off a third party's reasonable belief that the agent still can act.
Answer B. A principal's private revocation of actual authority does not automatically eliminate apparent authority as to a third party who has dealt with the agent and has no notice of the change. Harbor's prior course of dealing with Steel Supply, together with Harbor's allowing Nia to continue using her company title and email, supported Steel Supply's reasonable belief that Nia remained authorized. Because the July 3 order was routine and within the scope of prior transactions, Harbor is liable on the contract.
Why not A: This is tempting because the principal did privately revoke actual authority. However, the question requires consideration of the third party's perspective; apparent authority can bind the principal when the third party reasonably relies on the principal's outward manifestations and has no notice of the revocation.
Why not C: Past conduct can create implied actual authority, but an internal, private revocation ends that actual authority. The stronger and applicable basis here is apparent authority arising from Harbor's manifestations and Steel Supply's reasonable reliance, not lingering implied actual authority.
Why not D: This reflects a common overbroad assumption. Apparent authority does not end automatically upon a private revocation; it continues until the third party receives notice or the principal's actions no longer support the third party's reasonable belief. Harbor's failure to notify Steel Supply and its allowance of Nia's continued use of title/email make this choice incorrect.
Question 8
Hint
Analyze Metro and Apex separately: for each, did the supplier's belief come from Orion's own manifestations (or actual notice) or only from Patel?
Answer D. Metro had a history of dealing with Patel as Orion's agent; apparent authority can persist as to prior third parties until they receive actual notice of revocation, and Metro had not been notified by August 4 (notification came August 10), so Orion is bound on Metro's order. Apex had never dealt with Orion and relied only on Patel's statement; apparent authority requires a manifestation by the principal to the particular third party, which is absent for Apex, so Orion is not bound on Apex's order. (Note: public notices or website removals can sometimes defeat apparent authority as to unknown or future third parties, but here Apex did not rely on Orion's publication.)
Why not A: Tempting because a public notice looks like notice to the world, but it misapplies the rule. Prior counterparties who previously dealt with the agent typically require direct actual notice to defeat apparent authority; Metro had not received direct notice by August 4, so Orion remained bound as to Metro, and Apex lacked any principal-made manifestation anyway.
Why not B: Tempting because Patel's routine, repeated orders could lead one to think apparent authority extended to anyone relying on him. It fails because Apex had no prior dealings with Orion and relied only on Patel's uncorroborated statement; without a principal-made manifestation to Apex, apparent authority cannot be established.
Why not C: Tempting because actual authority did end when Orion revoked Patel. It fails because actual authority and apparent authority are distinct: apparent authority may persist as to prior third parties who have not received actual notice of revocation (like Metro), so Orion can remain bound as to Metro despite termination of actual authority.
Question 9
Hint
Focus on the difference between ending authority as between principal and agent versus ending the agent's power to bind the principal in the eyes of third parties.
Answer B. Private limitations end an agent's actual authority, but apparent authority depends on the principal's manifestations to third parties and on prior dealings that created reasonable reliance. Because vendors previously dealt with Reed while he had broader authority and Reed still holds the same title, direct notice to those vendors is the most reliable way to cut off apparent authority and minimize Maple's risk of being bound by later large orders.
Why not A: This correctly ends Reed's actual authority internally, but it does not eliminate apparent authority as to third parties who reasonably relied on Reed's prior authority (especially given his unchanged title) unless they receive notice of the change.
Why not C: A public posting may help with constructive notice, but it is not the best step for known vendors who previously relied on Reed; direct, targeted notice to those counterparties is more defensible to eliminate apparent authority.
Why not D: Refusing to ratify an unauthorized transaction does not prevent apparent authority from binding the principal if a third party reasonably believed the agent had authority based on prior dealings and manifestations; proactive notice is needed to prevent that reliance.
Common questions
Does firing an agent end apparent authority?
Not automatically. Mesa's termination ends Lane's actual authority, but Atlas can still reasonably rely on apparent authority until it has actual notice.
Is publication enough to notify prior dealers?
Not if Atlas remains unaware of the termination. A prior dealer needs actual notice, although actually reading the published notice would give Atlas knowledge and defeat reasonable reliance.
When does apparent authority end for a prior supplier?
When the supplier receives actual notice or otherwise learns that the authority ended. Atlas's June 4 receipt cuts off later reliance but does not undo the binding June 2 order.
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