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REG · Business Law · 9 practice questions

Ending Apparent Authority: Who to Notify and How

To end apparent authority, give prior dealers actual notice and use reasonably targeted public notice for others who knew of the agency. Below: follow one termination from revocation through a supplier's later order.

The rulePrior dealers need actual notice that the agent's authority ended. For parties without prior dealings who knew of the agency, publication reasonably calculated to reach them can cut off apparent authority.

Try one first

Delta Co. had allowed Lane, its purchasing agent, to place routine supply orders with OfficePro for the past 2 years. On July 1, Delta terminated Lane's authority and immediately told Lane to stop acting for the company. Delta did not contact OfficePro. On July 3, Lane placed another routine order with OfficePro in Delta's name, and OfficePro had no notice that Lane's authority had ended. To cut off Lane's apparent authority as to OfficePro, what response was required of Delta when it terminated Lane's authority?
Hint

Focus on the difference between ending authority as between principal and agent versus ending authority as it appears to a third party who has dealt with the agent before.

Step by step

  1. End actual authority

    Mesa terminates purchasing agent Lane on June 1. Lane's actual authority ends, but outsiders may still reasonably believe Lane can act for Mesa.

  2. Identify the prior dealer

    Atlas previously sold inventory to Mesa through Lane. That course of dealing supports Atlas's reasonable reliance on Lane for another ordinary inventory order.

  3. Send direct notice

    Mesa mails Atlas a direct revocation notice on June 1. Atlas needs actual notice because it previously dealt with Lane on Mesa's behalf.

  4. Correct the public appearance

    Mesa also removes Lane from its website and publishes termination in a regional trade journal. For sellers who knew of Lane's agency but had no prior dealings, publication reasonably calculated to reach them supplies constructive notice.

  5. Check receipt and actual knowledge

    Atlas receives the direct notice June 4 and has no knowledge of termination before Lane's June 2 routine order. Had Atlas actually read the public notice before contracting, that knowledge would defeat reasonable reliance.

  6. Apply the notice cutoff

    Mesa is bound on Atlas's June 2 order through apparent authority, even though Lane's actual authority ended June 1. The June 4 notice cuts off Atlas's reasonable reliance for later orders, not the earlier contract.

Key points

  • Remember: Firing the agent ends actual authority, but an uninformed prior dealer may still bind the principal.
  • Actual knowledge defeats reliance even when the prior dealer learns of termination by reading a public notice.
  • Strangers can be charged with constructive notice even if they never read the publication.

How the exam traps you

  • Firing Lane automatically ends all authority. Actual authority ends, but apparent authority can continue as to Atlas.
  • Publishing in a trade journal notifies every seller sufficiently. Publication can cover strangers, but it does not replace actual notice to an unaware prior dealer.
  • Mailing the notice ends apparent authority immediately. Compare Atlas's receipt date with the contract date, not the mailing date.

8 more, each from a different angle

0 of 8 answered · 0 correct

Question 2

GreenCo appoints Dana as its purchasing manager and introduces Dana to SupplyCo as the person who handles GreenCo's equipment purchases. GreenCo privately instructs Dana not to sign any equipment contract over $50,000 without the owner's approval. Dana then signs a $60,000 equipment contract with SupplyCo. SupplyCo does not know about the private limit and reasonably believes Dana has authority to make this type of purchase for GreenCo. Which statement is most accurate?
Hint

Focus on what SupplyCo was told or allowed to believe by GreenCo, not just on the private instruction Dana received.

Question 3

Patco appointed Rivera as its purchasing agent. For two years, Rivera regularly bought office supplies from Supplier X for Patco, and Patco consistently paid X on those orders. Rivera had never been authorized to purchase resale inventory, and Supplier Y had never received any communication from Patco about Rivera's authority. On June 1, Patco terminated Rivera's authority and informed only Rivera. Patco did not notify X or Y. On June 3, Rivera signed one contract with X to buy office supplies of a type and amount Rivera had previously been authorized to buy for Patco. That same day, Rivera signed a separate contract with Y to buy resale inventory, and Y relied only on Rivera's statement that Rivera was Patco's agent. Assume X and Y acted in good faith, had no notice of the termination, and Patco did not ratify either contract. Under common-law agency principles, what is the most appropriate treatment?
Hint

Separate actual authority from apparent authority, and ask what each supplier knew because of Patco's conduct, not because of Rivera's own statements.

Question 4

Atlas Co. appointed Nunez as its purchasing manager. Atlas emailed Vendor, a regular supplier, stating that Nunez would be Vendor's primary contact for ordering production materials. Atlas separately instructed Nunez, but not Vendor, that any single purchase order above $25,000 required CFO approval. During the next six months, Nunez placed three orders with Vendor for amounts between $27,000 and $30,000, and Atlas accepted and paid all three without objection. Nunez then placed a $29,000 order without CFO approval, and Vendor shipped the materials without knowing of Atlas's internal limit. Which conclusion is best supported?
Hint

Focus on what Vendor reasonably understood from Atlas's communications and prior conduct, not just on Atlas's private instructions to Nunez.

Question 5

Nora is Pecan Co.'s purchasing manager. Pecan expressly authorized Nora only to solicit bids for office security services and told her she could not sign any contract. SecureGuard knew Nora's authority was limited to collecting bids. Even so, Nora signed a 6-month monitoring contract in Pecan's name. Two days later, Pecan's president reviewed the signed contract, knew Nora had lacked authority when she signed it, allowed SecureGuard to begin providing services, and paid the first monthly invoice. SecureGuard had not withdrawn from the transaction before these events. Under general agency law, what is the most likely legal consequence?
Hint

Analyze the transaction in sequence: authority at signing first, then the principal's later conduct after learning all key facts.

Question 6

Pine Co. sent Retailer an email introducing Lee as Pine's "authorized sales representative for pricing and sales contracts." Pine had privately instructed Lee not to approve discounts greater than 10%, but Retailer was never told about that limit. Lee later signed a sales contract with Retailer that included an 18% discount. Retailer relied on Pine's email and prior dealings in which Lee negotiated contract terms for Pine. In deciding whether Pine is bound to the contract under apparent authority, which factor is the governing one?
Hint

For apparent authority, ask whose conduct matters to the third party's reasonable belief.

Question 7

Harbor Manufacturing, Inc. employed Nia as its purchasing manager. For the last 18 months, Nia regularly ordered raw materials from Steel Supply Co. on Harbor's behalf, and Harbor consistently paid those invoices. On July 1, Harbor privately revoked Nia's authority to make purchases, but Harbor did not notify Steel Supply and allowed Nia to continue using her Harbor email account and title during a one-week transition. On July 3, Nia placed a routine raw-material order with Steel Supply that matched prior orders in type and approximate quantity. Steel Supply had no notice of the revocation and reasonably believed Nia still had authority. Which conclusion is best supported?
Hint

Focus on the difference between ending authority internally and cutting off a third party's reasonable belief that the agent still can act.

Question 8

Orion Components, a disclosed principal, authorized Patel to buy routine copper inventory up to $50,000 per order. Patel repeatedly placed such orders for Orion with Metro Supply during Year 1. On August 1, Year 2, Orion terminated Patel and revoked his authority. On August 2 Orion removed Patel from its website and published a notice in an industry trade publication, but it did not notify Metro Supply directly until August 10. On August 4 Patel placed a $40,000 copper order in Orion's name with Metro; Metro had not learned of the termination. That same day Patel placed a $40,000 copper order in Orion's name with Apex Metals, a supplier that had never dealt with Orion and that relied only on Patel's statement that he still represented Orion. Neither order was ratified; both orders were the same kind Patel had previously been authorized to make, and no other manifestations were made by Orion to Apex. Under common-law agency principles, which conclusion is best supported?
Hint

Analyze Metro and Apex separately: for each, did the supplier's belief come from Orion's own manifestations (or actual notice) or only from Patel?

Question 9

Maple Office Supply Co. authorized Reed, its purchasing manager, to place routine supply orders of up to $10,000. Reed regularly placed orders with SupplyHub and several other vendors, and Maple paid those orders. In Year 2, Maple privately reduced Reed's authority to $1,000 but kept Reed in the same job title and did not otherwise communicate the change outside the company. Maple wants to minimize the risk that it will still be bound to those vendors if Reed places a larger order after the reduction. Which action should Maple take?
Hint

Focus on the difference between ending authority as between principal and agent versus ending the agent's power to bind the principal in the eyes of third parties.

Drill all 121 Agency questionsMixed across every rule in the topic, so you have to spot which one applies. That is how the exam does it.

Common questions

Does firing an agent end apparent authority?

Not automatically. Mesa's termination ends Lane's actual authority, but Atlas can still reasonably rely on apparent authority until it has actual notice.

Is publication enough to notify prior dealers?

Not if Atlas remains unaware of the termination. A prior dealer needs actual notice, although actually reading the published notice would give Atlas knowledge and defeat reasonable reliance.

When does apparent authority end for a prior supplier?

When the supplier receives actual notice or otherwise learns that the authority ended. Atlas's June 4 receipt cuts off later reliance but does not undo the binding June 2 order.

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