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ISC · Security and Confidentiality and Privacy · 6 practice questions

BEC Wire Fraud: Red Flags and Out-of-Band Verification

Hold suspicious payment changes until authorization is verified through a known, independent contact method and required approvals are complete. Below: judge possible responses to an urgent wire request that appears to come from the CFO.

The ruleTreat a suspicious payment-change request as suspected BEC. Hold the payment, verify through a previously known independent contact method, follow approved payment-change procedures, and notify information security.

Try one first

A payroll clerk receives an email that appears to come from the company's CFO requesting an immediate $187,000 wire transfer to a new vendor account because of a 'time-sensitive contractual payment.' The email uses the CFO's name in the display field but the sender address is cfo@company-payments.com (the company's official CFO email is cfo@company.com). The message arrived at 11:30 p.m., states 'do not call, I'm on a flight,' and asks the clerk to bypass the usual multi-step approval and process the transfer via the bank portal. Company policy requires verbal confirmation from the CFO for any payment over $50,000, and the clerk does have the CFO's verified mobile number on file. What is the most appropriate immediate response?
Hint

Compare the sender's display name to the actual sender domain, check for requests that bypass standard approval steps, and remember the company's verbal-confirmation rule for large transfers.

What should you do?

The situation

At Ridgewell, a clerk receives an urgent request to redirect a $150,000 vendor payment. The display name is the CFO's, but cfo@ridgewell-pay.com differs from ridgewell.com. The email has no links or attachments and says, "Don't call my office; use this number." Policy requires independent telephone verification and two-person approval. The clerk has the CFO's verified directory number. No wire has been sent.

  1. Hold the wire, call the CFO's verified directory number, follow vendor-change procedures, obtain the second approval, and notify information security.

    Best This breaks the attacker's communication path and satisfies the required controls before any money moves.

  2. Keep the wire on hold and notify information security before taking further action.

    Acceptable This prevents immediate loss and starts escalation. Independent verification and the required approvals still must occur before payment.

  3. Reply to the email and release the wire after receiving written confirmation.

    Wrong The attacker can reply. Confirmation within the same suspicious thread does not independently establish authorization.

  4. Call the number in the email and release the wire if the person confirms.

    Wrong The attacker supplied that number. A different communication method is not enough when its contact details come from the suspicious message.

  5. Send the wire now because the CFO requested it and the email contains no malicious attachment.

    Wrong BEC can work through payment instructions alone. Apparent executive authority and urgency do not replace verification or required approval.

Key points

  • Remember: Switching from email to phone is not independent verification if the suspicious email supplies the number.
  • A correct display name does not authenticate the sender. Check the actual domain.
  • BEC can redirect money without links, attachments, or malware.
  • Verification and required approvals are separate controls. Complete both before releasing the wire.

How the exam traps you

  • Replying to the suspicious email for confirmation. Use the CFO's previously verified directory number, not the attacker's email thread.
  • Calling the number supplied in the suspicious message. Obtain the number independently. An attacker can answer a phone call too.
  • Treating urgency, executive authority, or missing attachments as permission to pay. Keep the wire on hold until independent verification and required approvals are complete.

5 more, each from a different angle

0 of 5 answered · 0 correct

Question 2

At DeltaCo, the controller receives an email appearing to come from the CEO requesting an urgent $150,000 wire transfer to a 'new vendor' for a confidential project. The message uses the CEO's name and references internal project details, instructs the controller not to discuss the request, and comes from an email address with a subtle typo compared with the CEO's real address. There are no links or attachments. What type of attack is most likely occurring?
Hint

Consider whether the attack's goal is an immediate, targeted fund transfer using executive impersonation rather than delivering malware or sending generic messages to many recipients.

Question 3

The accounts payable manager at Apex Manufacturing receives an email that appears to come from an existing vendor, FastSupply Ltd. The message references a recent order and includes the correct invoice number and amount that Apex normally pays. It asks for an urgent wire transfer and provides a "new bank account" with routing details to be used for this invoice. There are no links or attachments, and the email signature and formatting mimic the vendor's usual style. However, the sending email domain differs slightly from the vendor's known domain, and the request arrived outside normal billing cycles. Company security logs show no malware detections or suspicious login attempts. Which type of attack is most likely described?
Hint

Focus on whether the attacker is directly requesting payment redirection via a targeted, spoofed vendor email (social-engineering of funds) versus trying to harvest credentials or intercept network traffic; note the absence of links/attachments and the accurate invoice details.

Question 4

An accounts payable clerk receives an email that appears to come from a long-time vendor. The message states that the vendor's bank account has changed and instructs the clerk to send all future payments to a new account immediately. The sender's email domain differs from the real vendor's domain by one letter, and the clerk wires funds to the new account. Assume no malware was downloaded and no system outage occurred. How should this incident be classified?
Hint

Focus on the attacker's primary method in the facts: Was the harm caused by deception, by malware, by service disruption, or by password guessing?

Question 5

A company's accounts payable clerk received an email that appeared to come from the CEO instructing an immediate $300,000 wire to Supplier S. The clerk relied on the email and the transfer was completed. Later the CEO said he did not send the message. IT log review shows a successful login to the CEO's mailbox from an IP address in Eastern Europe the same night and that an automatic forwarding rule was added. The company does not require multifactor authentication (MFA) for email and currently accepts email instructions to authorize wires. Which of the following is the most appropriate immediate corrective action and short-term control change to prevent similar losses going forward?
Hint

Focus on the log evidence (foreign login and added forwarding rule) and the organization's current authorization method for wires, what immediate containment and control changes address an account takeover and stop fraudulent transfer requests?

Question 6

A company's accounts payable manager received an email that appeared to come from a regular supplier asking that future payments be sent to a new bank account. The message addressed the manager by name, referenced a recent invoice number, used the supplier's logo in the signature, and contained no attachments or links. The manager updated the vendor record and initiated a $150,000 wire to the provided account. Two days later the real supplier said they never requested a bank‑account change and the funds were gone. Forensic analysis showed the message originated from an external IP and from an email domain that used a look‑alike character (for example, vend0r-inc.com versus vendor-inc.com); there was no evidence that the supplier's or the company's email accounts had been compromised. Which of the following controls would most likely have prevented this fraudulent wire transfer?
Hint

Decide whether this incident was primarily a technical account compromise or a social‑engineering/payment‑process failure, and pick the control that addresses that root cause.

Drill all 139 Threats and attacks questionsMixed across every rule in the topic, so you have to spot which one applies. That is how the exam does it.

Common questions

What should I do first with a suspected BEC wire request?

Hold the wire. Verify the request using a previously known contact method, follow the required approval process, and notify information security.

Does calling the phone number in an email count as out-of-band verification?

Not when the suspicious email supplies the number. Use an independently trusted number, such as the CFO's previously verified directory number.

Can an email be BEC without links or attachments?

Yes. Here, the attacker impersonates the CFO to redirect a payment. The fraud relies on persuasion rather than a malicious attachment or link.

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